We use an interactive epistemology framework to provide a systematic analysis of some solution concepts for games with asymmetric information. We characterize solution concepts using expressible epistemic assumptions, represented as events in the canonical space generated by primitive uncertainty about the payoff relevant state, payoff irrelevant information, and actions. In most of the paper, we adopt an interim perspective, which is appropriate to analyze genuine incomplete information. We relate Delta-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, 2003) to interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, Theoretical Economics 2, 2007) and to rationalizability in the interim strategic form. We also consider the ex ante perspective, which is appropriate to analyze asymmetric information about an initial chance move. We prove the equivalence between interim correlated rationalizability and an ex ante notion of correlated rationalizability.
Introduction
In the last few years, ideas related to rationalizability have been increasingly applied to the analysis of games with asymmetric information, interpreted either as games with genuine incomplete information (lack of common knowledge of the mappings from players' actions into their payoffs) or games with complete but imperfect information about an initial chance move.
1 Yet there seems to be no canonical definition of rationalizability for this class of games. Some authors put forward and apply notions that avoid the specification of a type space à la Harsanyi-Battigalli (2003) , Siniscalchi (2003, 2007) , Morris (2005, 2007) . Others instead deal with solution concepts for the Bayesian game obtained by appending a type space to the basic economic environment- Ely and Pęski (2006) , Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) . However, while the adoption of a type space (and Bayesian Nash equilibrium) is common practice in economics, applying notions of rationalizability to Bayesian games requires some care. It is well known that some modeling details, which arguably should not matter, do instead affect the conclusions of the analysis, as the following two examples illustrate.
Ex ante vs interim perspective
Although it seems natural to transform a Bayesian game into a strategic form game and apply standard rationalizability, there is more than one way to do this, and the results vary accordingly. Indeed, unlike with Bayesian Nash equilibrium, rationalizability in the ex ante strategic form, where each player chooses a mapping from types into actions, is a refinement of rationalizability in the interim strategic form, where each type of each player chooses an action.
2 To see this, consider the game below, where the payoff state Â 2 ‚ D fÂ 0 ; Â 00 g is known only to player 2, who chooses columns: L M R T 0; 3 0; 2 3; 0 B 2; 0 2; 2 2; 3 Â 0 L M R T 3; 3 0; 2 0; 0 B 2; 0 2; 2 2; 3 Â 00 Assume that player 1 ascribes equal probabilities to Â 0 and Â 00 and that there is common belief in this fact. Thus we obtain a Bayesian game where player 1 has only one (uninformed) type, who assigns equal probabilities to the two (informed) types of player 2, which we can identify with Â 0 and Â 00 . Given any conjecture about player 1's action, L is a best reply only if OET 2=3, while R is a best reply only if OET Ä 1=3. Thus the two strategies of player 2 that specify L (resp. R) under Â 0 and R (resp. L) under Â 00 , cannot be ex ante best replies to any conjecture . If player 1 assigns zero probability to these strategies, the expected payoff of T is at most 3=2, hence T is not ex ante rationalizable. On the other hand, interim rationalizability regards the two types of player 2 as different players: under Â 0 player 2 may believe OET 2=3, while under Â 00 she may believe OET Ä 1=3 (or vice versa). Thus, in the second iteration of the interim rationalizability procedure player 1 can assign high probability to R under Â 0 and L under Â 00 , and hence choose T as a best response. This implies that every action is interim rationalizable.
The difference between ex ante and interim rationalizability, as illustrated in this example, has been accepted as a natural consequence of the fact that the latter allows different types of the same player to hold different conjectures. However, we maintain that it is disturbing: ex ante expected payoff maximization is equivalent to interim expected payoff maximization, 3 and rationalizability is supposed to capture just the behavioral consequences of the assumption that players are expected payoff maximizers and have common belief in this fact. Given the above, how can ex ante and interim rationalizability deliver different results? There must be additional assumptions (i.e. besides rationality and common belief in rationality) determining the discrepancy. As we prove in section 4, these have little to do with the fact that types are treated as distinct players in the interim strategic form; instead, the reasons are to be found in the different independence assumptions underlying the two solution concepts; once these assumptions are removed, and thus correlation is allowed, we obtain equivalent ex ante and interim solution concepts.
Redundant types
Rationalizability in the (ex ante or interim) strategic form is not invariant to the addition of redundant types, that is, multiple types that encode the same information and hierarchy of beliefs. Indeed, Ely and Pęski (2006) and Dekel et al. (2007) noticed that adding redundant types may enlarge the set of rationalizable outcomes.
as we remark later on in the paper, is equivalent to rationalizability in the interim strategic form. Dekel et al. (2007) also introduce interim correlated rationalizability, a weaker notion that is invariant to the addition of redundant types. To illustrate, consider the following game, borrowed from Dekel et al. (2007) , where the payoff state Â 2 ‚ D fÂ 0 ; Â 00 g is unknown to both players: Assume that it is common belief that each player attaches equal probabilities to the two states. The simplest Bayesian game representing this situation has only one type N t i for each player i, with beliefs that give equal probabilities to the two pairs .Â 00 ; N t i / and .Â 00 ; N t i /. In this case the ex ante and interim strategic forms coincide, and B is dominated, hence not rationalizable: As before, it is common belief that Â 0 and Â 00 are considered equally likely, therefore we are just adding redundant types. But in the induced Bayesian game, B is rationalizable for both types of both players. Since ex ante rationalizability implies interim rationalizability, to see this it suffices to show that there are ex ante rationalizable strategies where either type chooses B. Let XY denote the strategy where t Note that BB is dominated, but the set fBN; NB; N N g fBN; NB; N N g has the best response property (Pearce, 1984) : as the underlined payoffs indicate, each strategy in the set of player i is a best response to some strategy in (and hence to some belief on) the set of player i. Thus, BN and NB are ex ante rationalizable, and B is interim rationalizable for every type, hence interim correlated rationalizable for every type. Adding redundant types can expand the rationalizable set of the strategic form. As we have already argued, (ex ante or interim) rationalizability must capture more than just common belief of expected payoff maximization in a situation of incomplete information. How are these additional assumptions related to the presence of redundant types? The reason is that a player may have payoff-irrelevant information that the other player believes to be correlated with the payoff state. The example shows that this is possible even if this payoff-irrelevant information does not affect the players' hierarchies of beliefs about the payoff state. Since actions may depend on this information, it is possible that a player's beliefs satisfy conditional independence when considering all the information of the other player, and yet when they are conditioned only on the payoff-relevant information (and hierarchy of beliefs over the payoff state) of the other player, they exhibit correlation between the payoff state and the other player's action. Thus, whenever redundancy can indeed be expressed in terms of payoff-irrelevant information, and such information is taken into account, conditional independence has less bite, and the set of rationalizable actions accordingly expands.
Expressible epistemic characterizations
The two issues illustrated above should make us suspicious about solution concepts mechanically obtained by applying a known solution algorithm (rationalizability) to the strategic forms of Bayesian games. In order to understand better the various solution concepts and their different predictions, a formal analysis of their underlying assumptions is needed, and this is precisely what we propose in this paper. Indeed, the problem with these notions is that they are not completely transparent because, unlike rationalizability in games of complete information, they have not been characterized using expressible assumptions about rationality and beliefs. To see what we mean, recall that for games with complete information, Tan and Werlang (1988) show that an action is rationalizable if and only if it is consistent with rationality, i.e. expected payoff maximization, and common belief in rationality.
5 These assumptions are expressible in a language describing primitive terms (actions) and 5 Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) prove a related result.
terms derived from the primitives (beliefs about actions, beliefs about actions and beliefs of others, etc.). As explained in Heifetz and Samet (1998) , the expressions in such a language can be represented as (and indeed identified with) measurable subsets of the canonical state space where each state specifies the players' actions and hierarchies of beliefs about actions.
6
Our aim is to characterize rationalizability in games of incomplete information in the same manner, and hence achieve a deeper understanding of the issues illustrated above. Expressing assumptions such as rationality, in the context of games with incomplete information, requires of course a richer language. Thus, our primitives include not only the actions A i available to each player i 2 I D f1; 2g, 7 but also the private information x i possessed by this player, as well as the payoff state Â. In order to get a general formulation, we explicitly disentangle the aspects of i's information that are payoff-relevant, denoted by Â i , from those that are not, denoted by
, and no player's payoff depends on y i . We write Â D .Â 0 ; Â 1 ; Â 2 / 2 ‚ 0 ‚ 1 ‚ 2 D ‚ and we let g i W ‚ A 1 A 2 ! R denote i's payoff function, so that we allow payoff uncertainty to persist (via Â 0 ) even after pooling all players' information. Note that y i can be strategically relevant because i's action can depend on it, and the other player can believe that it is correlated with Â 0 , thus inducing a potential correlation between Â 0 and i's action.
8 Indeed, our formulation allows us to state characterization results that otherwise could not be stated-we discuss the role of Â 0 and y i in more detail when we preview our results below.
In the language described above, an expressible assumption about player i is a measurable subset of the space X i A i H i , where H i is the space of hierarchies of beliefs based on the state of nature and each player's information and actions. More precisely, an element of H i is a sequence . 
9 Note that there is no redundancy in the construction, in the sense that every two points in the state space ‚ 0 .X 1 A 1 H 1 / .X 2 A 2 H 2 / must differ in terms of states of nature, information, actions, or beliefs thereof. Thus, our notion of expressibility is 6 This canonical state space is what Mertens and Zamir (1985) call the universal belief space, when we take their "parameter space" to be the set of action profiles. More details on Heifetz and Samet (1998) are provided below. 7 We assume two players for convenience; we comment on this assumption later on in the paper. 8 Economic examples abound: geological information and satellite photographs of a tract of land on sale are thought to be correlated with the value of the recoverable resources, expert reports on an object are thought to be correlated with the value of this object, personality traits and propensities may be thought to be correlated with ability, etc. The applied theorist who models a particular situation typically specifies these payoff-irrelevant variables.
9 As usual, we impose the coherency requirement on the sequences defining H i .
precisely that of Heifetz and Samet (1998) . 10 We insist on solution concepts being characterized using only expressible assumptions, because the primitive terms of the language (states of nature, information, actions) and hence the derived terms (beliefs and beliefs about beliefs over the primitive terms) are suggested by the problem at hand; our basic tenet is that once all potentially relevant parameters of the problem are specified, we are bound to use the corresponding (primitive and derived) terms and nothing more.
To see how we characterize solution concepts, think again of complete information. In that case, rationalizability gives for each player i a subset R i Â A i . The cited result of Tan and Werlang (1988) can then be stated as follows: if the sets ‚ 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 are all singletons-and hence can be omitted from notation-then an action a i belongs to R i if and only if there is some h i D . i / where i is not rational, or does not give probability one to i being rational, (or both) and so on ad infinitum.
Similarly, rationalizability with incomplete information specifies a subset of A i as a function of i's information and beliefs. More precisely, an interim notion specifies a correspondence into A i , whose domain is either X i or some abstract set T i of types à la Harsanyi, whereas an ex ante notion specifies a subset of strategies, which are functions from X i to A i . 11 The exercise we perform is then entirely analogous to the one sketched above for complete information. Given a correspondence S i W X i Ã A i , we look for expressible assumptions in X i A i H i which restricted to each x i 2 X i , give exactly S i .x i /. Similarly, given a correspondence 10 In the formalism of Heifetz and Samet (1998) , every subset S Â ‚ 0 X A is an expression, and if e and f are expressions, then :e, e \ f and B p i .e/ are also expressions for each i 2 I and p 2 OE0; 1, which we read as "not e", "e and f " and "player i attaches probability at least p to e," respectively. Heifetz and Samet (1998) show that given any state space specifying, at each state, the players' information, actions, and beliefs about the state space itself, we can view every expression as a measurable subset of it. Conversely, an event is expressible if it belongs to the -algebra generated by the expressions, when the latter are themselves viewed as events. It can be shown that expressibility of every event in the state space is equivalent to non-redundancy in the sense explained above. It follows that ‚ 0 .X 1 A 1 H 1 / .X 2 A 2 H 2 / is the unique (up to isomorphism) state space where all events can be seen as expressions and, conversely, every expression corresponding to some (nonempty) event in some state space, can be seen as a (nonempty) event in ‚ 0 .X 1 A 1 H 1 / .X 2 A 2 H 2 /.
11 We limit the ex ante analysis to the case where types correspond to information that can be learned, that is, to the case where T i D X i for each player i. We discuss this in more detail later on in the paper. Note that any set of functions from X i to A i can be seen as a set of selections from the correspondence given by the union of all their graphs; this allows a comparison between ex ante solution concepts and interim solution concepts. S i W T i Ã A i and a type t i 2 T i , we look for expressible assumptions which, restricted to some appropriate (expressible) features of t i , give exactly S i .t i /.
Preview of results
Our exploration begins with belief-free rationalizability and -rationalizability. The first solution concept specifies a correspondence R i W X i Ã A i obtained by iterated elimination, for each x i D .Â i ; y i /, of actions that are non-best replies, given Â i , to some conjecture i 2 .‚ 0 X i A i /, where the support of i is accordingly restricted at every step of the procedure. The second notion generalizes this procedure, yielding a correspondence R i W X i Ã A i obtained by asking that the conjectures i used for x i belong to some postulated set
The epistemic characterization of -rationalizability is by means of the following assumptions:
12 (i) the players are rational, (ii) their first-order beliefs satisfy the restrictions , and (iii) there is common belief in (i) and (ii). In the case of no restrictions, x i D .‚ 0 X i A i /, condition (ii) becomes vacuously true, thus belief-free rationalizability is characterized by rationality and common belief in rationality alone.
Then we move on to interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) and interim independent rationalizability (IIR). These two notions, like Bayesian Nash equilibrium, require a specification of a type space à la Harsanyi, describing the players' information and beliefs about Â 0 and each other's information. Formally, this is a structure .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I where T i is a space of types and
measurable functions. Thus ICR and IIR yield correspondences ICR i W T i Ã A i and IIR i W T i Ã A i , respectively, obtained by iterated elimination, for each t i 2 T i , of actions that are non-best replies, given # i .t i /, to some i 2 .‚ 0 T i A i /, where as before, the support of i is accordingly restricted at every step of the procedure.
Differently from ICR, IIR requires i to satisfy a conditional independence property: conditional on t i , Â 0 and a i are independent. This is reflected in the epistemic characterizations of the two notions, which are deeply different. ICR for a type t i is characterized by the following expressible assumptions: (i) the players are rational, (ii) there is common belief in rationality, and (iii) player i's information and hierarchy of beliefs, when restricted to its payoff-relevant aspects (the payoffrelevant information # i .t i / and the induced hierarchy of beliefs over the payoff state), agrees with the one specified by t i . The characterization of IIR is more difficult, and we can only give it in full when the assumed type space is non-redundant. This is because in the presence of multiple types encoding the same payoff-relevant and payoff-irrelevant information, as well as the same hierarchy of beliefs, we do not know how to relate distinct types to distinct expressible assumptions. Whenever the type space is non-redundant, however, even if there is redundancy in terms of payoff-relevant information and induced hierarchies of beliefs over the payoff state, we are able to characterize IIR for a type t i , as follows: (i) the players are rational, (ii) each player's beliefs regard the state of nature and the other player's action as independent, conditional on the private information and hierarchy of beliefs of the other player, (iii) there is common belief in (i) and (ii), and (iv) the hierarchy of beliefs is the one encoded by t i .
In the course of our analysis, we establish two corollaries relating ICR and IIR to -rationalizability. Whenever the type space has information types, that is, T i D X i for each player i, -rationalizability is equivalent to ICR or IIR, provided that the assumed restrictions are, in a natural sense, those implied by the type space. The case of information types is also the focus of our last section, in which we consider ex ante rationalizability. In that section we introduce two new notions, ex ante -rationalizability and ex ante correlated rationalizability, which we relate to the interim solution concepts analyzed earlier. Our main result in that section is that ex ante correlated rationalizability is equivalent to ICR. Thus, contrary to interim and ex ante rationalizability, which differ because of their underlying (and different) independence assumptions, their correlated versions provide the same predictions.
Preliminaries
The basic ingredient of our analysis is a structure .‚ 0 ; ‚ i ; Y i ; A i ; g i i2I / where ‚ 0 is a finite set of states of nature and I D f1; 2g is the set of players; each player i is endowed with a finite set A i of feasible actions, and the finite sets ‚ i and Y i represent i's payoff-relevant and payoff-irrelevant private information, respectively; we call each Â i 2 ‚ i a payoff type and each
as a payoff state and to each x 2 X WD X 1 X 2 as an information state, and we assume that each player i's utility depends on the payoff state through the function
A list of symbols at the end of the paper collects the notation introduced above, as well as the notation introduced in the remainder of this section.
Type spaces and exogenous beliefs
Interim solution concepts specify actions for each player as a correspondence of his information type and exogenous beliefs, that is, interactive beliefs about the state of nature and each other's information. Such beliefs are often modeled using Harsanyi's (1967-68) representation: a type space based on ‚ 0 X, or simply X-space, which is a tuple .T i ; i ; i / i2I where each T i is a Polish space and the
13 Such a model describes the players' information and, implicitly, their hierarchies of beliefs about the state of nature and each other's information; we call these X-hierarchies and we define them as usual, following Mertens and Zamir (1985) , whose construction we now review. For every player i, let H 1 X;i D .‚ 0 X i / designate the space of first-order X-beliefs, and for all k 1 define recursively
Note that, by the coherency conditions on marginal distributions, each element of the set in (1) is determined by its last coordinate; thus, whenever convenient, for all
X; i /, the space of k-order X-beliefs of player i. The space of X-hierarchies of i is
This space is compact metrizable (hence Polish), and there is a homeomorphism
The X-hierarchies described by an X-space .T i ; i ; i / i2I are computed recursively: for each i 2 I and t i 2 T i , the first-order X-belief induced by t i is defined as follows:
Then, the k-order X-belief induced by t i is defined as follows: for each measurable
This gives a function Á X;i W T i ! H X;i satisfying, for each t i 2 T i and each
It is well known that Á X;i is not necessarily injective, that is, there may be multiple types inducing the same X-hierarchy. More generally, the X-space is said to be non-redundant if for all i 2 I and distinct t i ; t
In this case, for each player i the space T i can be seen as a measurable subset of X i H X;i and under this identification, by (4), the tuple
Hierarchies of beliefs over the payoff state
An X-space describes, in particular, the players' payoff information and their hierarchies of beliefs about the payoff state, which we call ‚-hierarchies. These are defined just like X-hierarchies, but letting ‚ play the role of X everywhere in (1) and (2) above. Thus H 1 ‚;i D .‚ 0 ‚ i / is the space of first-order ‚-beliefs of player i, whereas a k-order ‚-belief of player i is an element of
a ‚-hierarchy of player i is an element of
and a homeomorpshim analogous to (3) exists:
To see how each type in an X-space .T i ; i ; i / i2I induces a ‚-hierarchy, note that for each player i we can write the function i as a pair of measurable functions .# i ; i /, where
recursively, the induced k-order ‚-belief is defined as follows: for each measurable
Note that the function Á ‚;i W T i ! H ‚;i thus obtained fails to be injective whenever, though not only if, the function Á X;i W T i ! H X;i does so. In other words, two types inducing the same X-hierarchy must induce the same ‚-hierarchy, while two types inducing the same ‚-hierarchy may induce distinct X-hierarchies. This fact plays an important role in the characterization of IIR below; we provide a full characterization of IIR whenever the assumed type space is non-redundant, and only in such a case; thus, we allow for redundancies in the sense of ‚-hierarchies, though we cannot extend our characterization to the case of redundancies in the sense of X-hierarchies.
Type spaces with information types
Applied models in economics often disregard (or do not include for some other reason) payoff-irrelevant information, and assume the simplest possible type spaces, those where distinct types must differ in the payoff-relevant information that they encode; in our framework, we can define such a payoff type space as an X-space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I where for each player i, T i D ‚ i , # i is the identity function, and i is constant. In many applied models that do specify payoff-irrelevant information in a less trivial way, the analogous simplification is made, by assuming that information determines X-beliefs; 15 formally, a type space with information types is a type space .T i ; i ; i / i2I where T i D X i and i is the identity for each player i. For brevity, throughout the paper we write just .X i ; i / i2I to denote such an X-space.
Besides being pervasive in applications, type spaces with information types are special in at least two other respects. First, they are always non-redundant, because distinct types must differ at least in the information type that they induce. Second, they feature the following triviality property: the X-hierarchy induced by each type is determined by its induced first-order X-belief. More precisely, for every type x i we have the following: every X-hierarchy that (i) has the same firstorder X-belief as the one induced by x i , and (ii) puts positive probability only on the information-hierarchy pairs of i that are induced by some type of i, must coincide with the X-hierarchy induced by x i . We record this in the following remark, which is used in the proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2 below. Remark 1. Fix an X-space with information types .X i ; i / i2I . For every i 2 I , x i 2 X i and h X;i 2 H X;i such that
are equivalent. Indeed, the former implies the latter by belief-closedness, while the converse follows at once from coherency of h X;i .
Endogenous beliefs and interactive epistemology
Interactive epistemology views solution concepts-correspondences from information types into actions, or from types in an X-space into actions-as reduced forms of models that explicitly describe the players' (hierarchies of) endogenous beliefs, that is, beliefs (and beliefs about beliefs) over actions and payoff states and payoffirrelevant information. Formally, the space of first-order A-beliefs of player i is
and the space of A-hierarchies of player i is
Similarly to the spaces of X-hierarchies and ‚-hierarchies, the space of A-hierarchies is also compact metrizable, and here, too, there is a homeomorphism
The space of A-hierarchies of player i describes all possible beliefs that i can entertain regarding the state of nature, player i's information and action, player i's belief about the state of nature and i's information and action, and so on. In particular, each A-hierarchy embodies an X-hierarchy and a ‚-hierarchy, which we can compute naturally by recursive marginalization. In what follows we let % X;i W H i ! H X;i and % ‚;i W H i ! H ‚;i designate these mappings.
E D E 1 E 2 , where for every player i, E i is an assumption about i. All the epistemic characterizations we provide below involve rationality of all players, which is the joint assumption that each player chooses an action maximizing his expected payoff given his payoff type and first-order A-beliefs. Thus, 17 we let RAT D ‚ 0 RAT 1 RAT 2 , where
Our characterizations involve not only rationality, but also common belief in rationality and possibly other assumptions. Given any joint assumption E D E 1 E 2 , for every i 2 I let
Then the joint assumption of (correct) common belief in E is
For each player i, we write CB i .E/ for the projection of CB.E/ on X i A i H i .
Belief-free rationalizability and iterated dominance
The simplest interim solution concept that we consider takes as given the economic environment alone. The solution set specifies a correspondence R i W X i Ã A i for each player i, which is defined as follows:
This version of rationalizability, which is belief-free in that its computation does not need a specification of X-beliefs of any sort, is equivalent to the following interim iterated dominance procedure:
Note that the payoff-irrelevant information plays no role here: any two information types specifying the same payoff type have the same set of belief-free rationalizable actions. Indeed, rationality itself has nothing to do with payoff-irrelevant information, and belief-free rationalizability for an information type is the consequence of rationality and common certainty of rationality alone, given the payoff information that it specifies. Thus, belief-free rationalizability is characterized by both of the following equalities (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999 , Proposition 4): for every i 2 I and
where OEÂ i and OEx i are the assumptions about player i defined as follows:
19 This extends the classical iterated dominance characterization of rationalizability in complete information games due to Pearce (1984) -see Battigalli (2003) . The procedure has been used by Bergemann and Morris (2009) to define iterative implementation and prove that it is equivalent to robust (or type-space-independent) implementation. 20 Note that neither directly implies the other. Indeed, the second equality in (5) is equivalent to
i / for all .Â i ; y i / 2 X i , and therefore it leaves open the possibility that the first equality is violated for some x i 2 X i . On the other hand, obtaining the second equality from the first requires the observation that the belief-free rationalizable actions of an information type only depends on its payoff type. The analogous remark applies to the alternative characterizations of -rationalizability that we provide in (6) and (7) 
-rationalizability
The notion of -rationalizability is also meant to capture strategic reasoning in the assumed economic environment with no reference to type spaces. It generalizes the belief-free approach described above-see Battigalli (2003) and Siniscalchi (2003, 2007) . The solution concept specifies a correspondence R i W X i Ã A i for each player i, taking as given a profile of information-dependent first-order restrictions: formally, D .. .Â i ; y i / is the set of all a i 2 A i such that for some i 2 .Â i ;y i / ,
Note that with trivial restrictions, that is, with x i D .‚ 0 X i A i / for all i 2 I and x i 2 X i , this reduces to belief-free rationalizability. As we prove below, ICR and IIR on type spaces with information types are also special cases of -rationalizability. Before proceeding, let us record here the epistemic characterization of -rationalizability due to Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007, Proposition 1) . For each i 2 I and x i 2 X i , define the assumption
where OE i is the assumption that player i satisfies the restrictions, whatever his information type, that is,
Then -rationalizability is characterized by the following generalization of the first equality in (5): for all i 2 I and x i 2 X i ,
Thus, -rationalizability corresponds to the assumption that players are rational, their information and first-order beliefs satisfy the restrictions , and there is common belief in these two facts. As a matter of fact, analogously to belief-free rationalizability, -rationalizability for player i depends on his information only through the corresponding payoff type and restrictions. Thus, a generalization of the second equality in (5) also holds: for all i 2 I and x i D .Â i ; y i / 2 X i ,
3.3 Interim correlated rationalizability
The notion of interim correlated rationalizability or ICR, introduced by Dekel et al. (2007) , applies to the Bayesian game induced by an X-space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I . The solution set specifies for each player i a correspondence ICR i W T i Ã A i which is defined as follows: 
The intuition for this solution concept is that type t i of player i forms a probabilistic conjecture i on how the behavior of i depends on her type t i and on the state of nature Â 0 , possibly taking into account an implicit correlation device. Indeed, as its name suggests, ICR allows the possibility that according to the probability distribution over ‚ 0 T i A i induced by i .t i / and i , 22 the state of nature Â 0 and the opponent's action a i are correlated, even after conditioning on i's type.
The conjecture i must rationalize a i in the sense of (9), and it must be itself rationalizable in the sense of being supported by rationalizable actions, as specified by (8), but is otherwise unrestricted. This is reflected in the following theorem, which proves that ICR reflects rationality and common belief in rationality alone, given the ‚-hierarchies induced by the assumed type space. More precisely, given an X-space and a type t i of player i in it, consider the following assumption: player i is rational, commonly believes in the rationality of all players, and his payoff type and ‚-hierarchy are those induced by t i . The theorem below states that ICR for t i captures the behavioral consequences of this assumption, and indeed of any other, stronger assumption obtained by restricting i's exogenous information or beliefs (while keeping the payoff type and ‚-hierarchy induced by t i , of course).
For each player i, let E i be the -algebra of exogenous assumptions about i, namely, the family of all (measurable) subsets E i Â X i A i H i which can 21 The sets ‚ i and Y i are singletons (and hence do not appear at all) in Dekel et al. (2007) . However, their definitions and results extend seamlessly to our framework. In particular, they prove a result (Proposition 2) similar to Theorem 1, and they also prove that any two types (possibly from different type spaces) mapping into the same ‚-hierarchy have the same ICR actions, which obtains here as an obvious consequence of Theorem be seen as subsets of X i H X;i in the sense that, for some nonempty, measurable
Given a type space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I we say an exogenous assumption E i 2 E i is ‚-compatible with type t i of player i, provided that for all .Â i ; y i ; a i ; h i / 2 E i ,
In words, E i is an exogenous assumption ‚-compatible with t i if all of its elements specify the payoff type and ‚-hierarchy induced by t i , and if it does not exclude any action or A-hierarchy whose induced X-hierarchy is not itself excluded. Note that the largest exogenous assumption ‚-compatible with t i is
which simply says that i's payoff type and ‚-hierarchy are those specified by t i , whereas a minimal such assumption has the following form: for some y i 2 Y i and h X;i 2 H X;i with .
which says that i has payoff type # i .t i /, some fixed payoff-irrelevant information y i (possibly different from i .t i /) and some fixed X-hierarchy h X;i (possibly different from Á X;i .t i /) whose induced ‚-hierarchy is the same as the one induced by t i . Now we are ready to characterize ICR.
Theorem 1. Fix a type space .T i ; i ; i / i2I . For all i 2 I , t i 2 T i , and E i 2 E i ‚-compatible with t i ,
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 23 One might think that, in order to show that (13) holds for every E i 2 E i , it would be enough to prove it just for the case where E i is as large as possible, that is, where E i is the set in (11), which embodies just the assumption that i's payoff type and ‚-hierarchy are those induced by t i . However, considering a more restrictive assumption-some E i 2 E i which is ‚-compatible with t i , but which is a strict subset of the set in (11)-can, in principle, change the right-hand side of (13). See also our comment in footnote 20.
Interim correlated rationalizability and -rationalizability coincide in the case of a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I , whenever specifies (only) the restrictions derived from it, that is, whenever for all i 2 I and x i 2 X i ,
This follows from Theorem 1, using (6), as we now show.
24
Corollary 1. Fix a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I and let be the set of restrictions derived from it. Then for every i 2 I and x i 2 X i , (6) and Theorem 1 it suffices to show that CB i .OE/ \ OEx i \ OE x i is an exogenous assumption ‚-compatible with x i . Given (12), this will follow from
which we now prove. Since
\ OE x i and the analogous holds for player i, it suffices to show: for all
Indeed, this follows at once from belief-closedness and coherency (see Remark 1).
Interim independent rationalizability
The solution concept of interim independent rationalizability or IIR-analyzed in Ely and Pęski (2006) -also applies to the Bayesian game induced by an X-space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I . Similarly to ICR, it specifies for each player i a correspondence
a i 2 arg max
24 Corollary 1 can be also proved directly, as we do in Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo, and Penta (2008) . Indeed, if is the set of restrictions derived from a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I , then x i is precisely the set of probability distributions on ‚ 0 X i A i induced by i .x i / and some conjecture i W ‚ 0 X i ! .A i /.
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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 11 [2011] 25 where the set of players is T 1 [ T 2 and the set of available actions of each player/type t i is A i . Indeed, in this game the payoff to player/type t i when choosing action a i depends only on the actions chosen by the players/types in T i , and given a mixed action profile i W T i ! .A i / for such types, it is defined as
Thus, the set of actions that are rationalizable in the interim strategic form for player/type t i is
, an obvious induction shows that these requirements are the same as (14) and (15), and hence that
Formally, the only difference from ICR is that the conjecture i used by t i to rationalize a i cannot depend on the state of nature; under the probability distribution on ‚ 0 T i A i induced by i .t i / and i , the conditional probabilities of i's actions given i's type do not depend on Â 0 . Indeed, it is clear that the two notions coincide if there is only one state of nature, as is the case in many economic applications; 26 we record this fact in the next remark. (Recall that we are assuming two players-the claims in the remark are not true with more players.) Remark 3. Assume distributed knowledge of the payoff state, i.e. assume that ‚ 0 is a singleton. Then ICR i .t i / D IIR i .t i / for every type space .T i ; i ; i ; / i2I and every i 2 I , t i 2 T i . Thus, by Theorem 1,
In general, however, IIR and ICR differ, and the characterization of IIR in the latter remark fails to hold. To be sure, the definition of IIR, just like the definition of ICR, makes no reference to the mappings . i / i2I , but unlike with ICR, where the exact specification of these mappings (and hence of anything beyond the induced ‚-hierarchies) is also entirely irrelevant for the solution, the IIR actions of a type do not depend just on its induced ‚-hierarchy. This is precisely because the independence between the state of nature and the opponent's action embodied in IIR is conditional on the opponent's type, not just on her ‚-hierarchy (and in the case of a redundant type space, not even on her X-hierarchy).
As we have argued earlier, we do not know how to express what it means for two different types to choose different actions, if the difference between the types themselves is not expressible in the given language, i.e. if the two types induce the same X-hierarchy. Therefore, our task here is to provide a full characterization of IIR for those cases where such differences can be traced to expressible features of the types, namely, for non-redundant type spaces. These can be seen as beliefclosed sets of hierarchies, hence independence conditional on the opponent's type does correspond, in those cases, to an expressible assumption. Now we formalize this assumption and then state our characterization result, which says that IIR is the expression of rationality, conditional independence, and common belief thereof, given the X-hierarchies induced by the type space.
For every player i, let H i;CI designate the set of all h i 2 H i such that, according to the belief ' i .h i /, the state of nature and the action of player i are independent, conditional on every exogenous assumption about player i. Formally, h i 2 H i;CI provided that for all Â 0 2 ‚ 0 and a i 2 A i the condition
holds ' i .h i /-almost everywhere, with
denoting any regular conditional probability given the measure ' i .h i / and thealgebra E i . Such regular conditional probability exists because ‚ 0 X i A i H i is a Polish space (see Dudley, 2002, p. 345) . Moreover, as we establish in Appendix A.2, the set H i;CI does not depend on the particular version of conditional probability that we choose, and furthermore, it is measurable. Thus, we can define the joint assumption CI D ‚ 0 CI 1 CI 2 , where CI i D X i A i H i;CI for every i 2 I . Now for all i 2 I and h X;i 2 H X;i let
With these definitions, we can characterize IIR. 
Furthermore, if the type space is non-redundant, then
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Note that the right-hand side of the first inclusion contains the right-hand side of the second, because OE.# i .t i /; i .t i // Â OE# i .t i /. This implies that the two right-hand sides are equal (and hence the two inclusions are, in fact, equalities) in the non-redundant case; in this case the IIR actions of type t i depend on payoffirrelevant information only through the X-hierarchy induced by t i , and not (directly) on its own payoff-irrelevant information i .t i /. In the presence of redundancies, however, the first inclusion is, in general, strict. To illustrate, consider again the example of section 1.2. Assume that X 1 and X 2 are both singletons, X 1 D f N x 1 g and X 2 D f N x 2 g, so that the second type space in the example is redundant not only in terms of ‚-hierarchies, but also in terms of X-hierarchies. All types in the example induce the same X-hierarchy:
But, as we have seen,
Similarly to what we showed for ICR, we can identify -rationalizability with IIR for an X-space with information types .X i ; i / i2I , whenever the following holds: the restrictions are derived from the X-space, and moreover, they embody independence between state of nature and opponent's action, conditional on the player's information. Let us say that i 2 .
CI denote this set of first-order beliefs, and say that is CI-derived from .X i ; i / i2I if for all i 2 I and x i 2 X i , 27
27 Analogously to our remark in footnote 24, here we note that the equivalence between IIR andrationalizability (Corollary 2) can be proved directly, and indeed we do so in Battigalli et al. (2008) . If is the set of restrictions CI-derived from a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I , then x i is the set of probability distributions on ‚ 0 X i A i induced by i .x i / and some 
Proof. Since CB i .RAT \OE/ D CB i .RAT /\CB i .OE/ and CB i .RAT \CI / D CB i .RAT / \ CB i .CI /, by (6) and Theorem 2 it suffices to prove
and analogously for player i. Thus, the claim follows by the same argument as in the proof of Corollary 1.
Ex ante rationalizability
In this section we show that the differences between rationalizability in the ex ante and interim strategic form of a Bayesian game are due to the different independence restrictions that are embodied in these solution concepts. This follows from a preliminary result about -rationalizability that helps clarifying the conceptual issue; given any set of information-dependent restrictions on beliefs, we define a notion of ex ante correlated -rationalizability, and we show that it is in a strong sense equivalent to the interim notion of -rationalizability introduced earlier. Then we define a notion of ex ante correlated rationalizability that is equivalent to ICR in the same sense.
Ex ante -rationalizability
Consider the point of view of player i in an ex ante stage where he does not know x i yet, and let S i be the set of all functions from X i to A i . Then we can define a structural ex ante strategic form with two real players, 1 and 2, choosing strategies in S 1 and S 2 , respectively, and a fictitious player choosing an element of ‚ 0 X, with the payoff function
Now fix a set of restrictions i D . x i / x i 2X i where x i Â .‚ 0 X i A i / for every x i 2 X i . This entails restrictions on the belief i 2 .‚ 0 X S i / that player i can entertain ex ante about the fictitious player's choice and the strategy and moreover, conditional on x i , it yields interim beliefs in x i , that is,
where N i is the probability distribution on ‚ 0 X A i induced by i , namely
The set of ex ante -rationalizable strategies is thus defined:
is the set of all s i 2 S i such that, for some i 2
Note that i may exhibit correlation between the fictitious player and player i. In order to relate ex ante -rationalizability with -rationalizability, observe that given a correspondence F i W X i Ã A i and a set S 
As the following result shows, this is precisely the sense in which the ex anterationalizable strategies AR i are equivalent to the -rationalizability correspon-
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 28 We impose this weak requirement to derive well-defined interim beliefs and avoid tedious issues concerning the differences between ex ante and interim expected payoff maximization. Alternatively, we could impose a perfection requirement (see Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987) . This discussion would distract the reader's attention from the important issues.
29 Adapting the argument Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007) use to prove their Proposition 1, one can show that AR i is the set of ex ante structural strategic form strategies of i that are consistent with (correct) common belief in rationality and in the restrictions .
Ex ante correlated rationalizability
Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 yield an equivalence result for ex ante and interim correlated rationalizability in Bayesian games with information types. Before stating the result formally, let us first review the standard notion of ex ante rationalizability. We restrict our attention to the case in which Harsanyi types represent information that can be learned, that is, the case of information types. However, we remark that an equivalence result like the one stated below can be proved for every Bayesian game.
A strategy for the Bayesian game induced by a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I is ex ante rationalizable if it is rationalizable in the ex ante strategic form of the game. To define the ex ante strategic form, we must first specify ex ante beliefs on ‚ 0 X consistent with the type space. Thus, we say that a prior
Once we fix a consistent prior … i for each player i, the ex ante strategic form of the induced Bayesian game is given by the expected payoff functions specified as follows: for all i 2 I ,
It can be verified that the rationalizable strategies in this game do not depend on the particular priors … 1 , … 2 that we fix, as long as we they are consistent with the given type space.
It is also standard to show that ex ante rationalizability implicitly relies on an ex ante independence assumption: a player's beliefs about .Â 0 ; x/ and s i are given by a product measure. Indeed, anticipating the next definition, this amounts to choosing a conjecture of the form i D … i i , where i 2 .S i /. Ex ante independence implies interim independence, hence ex ante rationalizability implies interim independent rationalizability, or equivalently, rationalizability in the interim strategic form of the Bayesian game-see Remark 2.
31 30 As before, we include this essentially innocuous requirement just to avoid distracting the reader. 31 The difference between ex ante and interim rationalizability is related to the difference between two notions of extensive form rationalizability: the more restrictive one assumes that a player has an initial conjecture about the opponent's strategy, which may be revised only after receiving some information about the opponent's behavior; the less restrictive, adopted by Pearce (1984) , drops the initial conjecture and allows a player to have different conjectures at different information sets even if they only reflect information about chance moves. When we consider the extensive form of a static
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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 11 [2011] We now define a notion of ex ante correlated rationalizability that removes the said ex ante independence assumption. Fix a type space with information types .X i ; i / i2I and priors … 1 , … 2 consistent with it. For each player i the set of ex ante correlated rationalizable strategies is defined as ACR i D \ k 0 ACR k i , where ACR 0 i D S i and for all k 1, recursively, ACR k i is the set of all s i 2 S i for which there exists i 2 .‚ 0 X S i / such that
s i 2 arg max
It can be shown that, just like with ex ante rationalizability, the ex ante correlated rationalizable strategies do not depend on the priors that we choose, as long as they are consistent with .X i ; i / i2I .
Proposition 2. Fix a type space with information types and priors consistent with it. Let be the restrictions derived from the type space. Then for all i 2 I ,
Proof. Fix a type space .X i ; i / i2I with information types, and let D . i / i2I be the set of restrictions derived from it. For every i 2 I and i 2 .‚ 0 X S i /, the conditions of consistency of i with i and of marg ‚ 0 X i D … i with .X i ; i / i2I are identical. Thus, for all k 1, every such i is consistent with i and satisfies (17) and (18), if and only if it satisfies (19), (20) and (21).
We can now prove the main result in this section.
Theorem 3. Fix a type space with information types and priors consistent with it.
Then for every i 2 I ,
Thus, looking deeper into the discrepancy between ex ante and interim rationalizability, we see that it is due to the different independence restrictions, not Bayesian game, the first solution concept yields ex ante rationalizability and the second one yields interim rationalizability. To the best of our knowledge, Battigalli (1988, pp. 719-720 , footnote 1) is the first published work pointing out the difference.
to different types being allowed or not to hold different conjectures. Indeed, once these restrictions are removed, the discrepancy disappears: ex ante correlated rationalizability treats different types just as different information sets of the same player, and yet it is fully equivalent to ICR.
Discussion

Extensions
n players. The most natural extension of IIR to static games with more than two players assumes that each type of each player believes that, conditional on the opponents' types, the payoff state and all the opponents' actions are mutually independent, whereas the natural extension of ICR allows for general correlation. All our characterization results have straightforward generalizations to this more general framework, except for the one in Remark 3. Indeed, for this natural extension of IIR, our remark about the equivalence between IIR and ICR under distributed knowledge of the payoff state does not hold, for the same reasons why independent rationalizability is a refinement of correlated rationalizability in games with complete information.
Dynamic games. -rationalizability in dynamic games with incomplete information has been studied by Battigalli (2003) , Siniscalchi (2003, 2007) and Battigalli and Prestipino (2011) . These papers discuss also how to model independence assumptions in dynamic games. They study two versions of the solution concept, one that features a forward induction principle in the spirit of Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997) , and a weaker one that does not. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007) give characterizations of both versions, thus extending our characterizations in (6) and (7). Battigalli and Prestipino (2011) provide an alternative characterization of the forward-induction version of -rationalizability.
32 Proposition 1 on ex ante and interim -rationalizability can also be extended. Similarly, one can define versions of ICR and IIR for dynamic Bayesian games with and without forward induction. (Penta, 2009 deals with the analogue of ICR without forward induction, defining analogues for the other notions is straightforward.) For these solution concepts, we can provide appropriate extensions of Propositions 1, 2 and Theorem 3; we conjecture that an extension of Theorem 1 also holds.
Related literature
We already mentioned the relationship with the work of Battigalli (2003) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) on -rationalizability. Here we just notice that none of these papers makes the difference between payoff relevant and payoff irrelevant information explicit; actually, their notation and language suggest that only payoff relevant information is considered, although this is not a formal assumption. Furthermore, these papers assume distributed knowledge of the payoff state, although their results do not depend on this assumption.
ICR has been introduced by Dekel et al. (2007) , who also provide some epistemic characterization results. They prove that the ICR actions of a type only depend on the induced ‚-hierarchy. 33 The most important differences between their approach and ours is that they neglect private information (like Ely and Pęski, 2006) and do not state their epistemic results as expressible characterizations, i.e. by means of events in the appropriate canonical universal type space. These differences are related. One advantage of modeling private information (including the payoff irrelevant one) explicitly, is that this provides a sufficiently rich language with which we can express the property of information-based conditional independence and the related characterization of IIR. We find the analogous characterization of Dekel et al. (2007) less instructive because it relies on an interpretation of the type space as an "objective" information system that cannot be expressed in a formal language. Moreover, in our richer framework we can relate IIR and ICR to -rationalizability, and we can formally state the obvious but important point that ICR and IIR are equivalent with two players and distributed knowledge of the payoff state. Ely and Pęski (2006) analyze IIR. Like Dekel et al. (2007) , their starting point is the observation that IIR is not invariant to the addition/deletion of redundant types, and therefore depends on something more than the induced ‚-hierarchies (or even X-hierarchies). Their approach to IIR is essentially orthogonal to ours. We look for conditions under which IIR actions admit an expressible characterization, whereas they change the notion of belief hierarchy in order to obtain one that identifies IIR actions. They show that, under some regularity conditions, Harsanyi types yield-besides the standard ‚-hierarchies-also richer -hierarchies where i's first-order beliefs are elements of ..‚ 0 ‚ i //. 34 Then they show that -hierarchies identify IIR actions. It is not clear to us whetherhierarchies are expressible in a meaningful sense. To elaborate further, take any type space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I . As Ely and Pęski (2006, p. 28) point out, letting i .t i j / W T i ! .‚ 0 ‚ i / for each i 2 I and t i 2 T i denote a version of the conditional probability given i's type t i , we obtain -hierarchies: in particular, the first-order belief in the -hierarchy induced by type t i is defined as follows: for every measurable E Â .‚ 0 ‚ i /,
If the type space has information types, so that T i D X i , then one can express this first-order belief as uncertainty about the relevant probability measure in the array . i .t i jx i // x i 2X i , thus making -hierarchies expressible in some sense. But if the type space does not have information types, then we are not allowed to identify T i and X i , and this interpretation cannot be offered. Sadzik (2009) seems to take a similar route to Ely and Pęski (2006) : he defines hierarchical beliefs that identify Bayesian equilibrium actions. But on closer inspection, we find his approach much more similar to ours. He enriches the environment by adding to the payoff state Â a countable sequence of payoff-irrelevant (and continuous) signals for each player. On this expanded space of exogenous primitive uncertainty, call it Z, he constructs a formal language and relates it to standard Z-based hierarchies, showing that they identify Bayesian equilibrium actions. We speculatively propose the following interpretation of the difference between our approach to modeling uncertainty and his: we assume that there is common awareness only of a finite number of signals and consequently put only those signals in the commonly known environment. 35 This justifies conditionally correlated beliefs: when i conditions on the information type x i of i, he suspects that i may observe some other payoff irrelevant variable i is not aware of, which in turn may be correlated with Â 0 , thus allowing correlation between Â 0 and a i conditional on i's information type-this is a restatement of the incomplete model interpretation of conditional correlation given by Dekel et al. (2007) . On the other hand, Sadzik (2009) puts in the environment all the "conceivable" signals, which is justified if there is common awareness of all of them. Liu (2009) analyzes Bayesian equilibrium predictions and the role of redundant types using an approach similar to ours. In particular, he distinguishes 34 Ely and Pęski (2006) have no private information-in our framework, this would correspond to the case where X i is a singleton for each player i. We translate their definitions into our framework in the obvious way. 35 Of course, a player may observe payoff-irrelevant aspects of which the opponent is unaware. In this case our rationalizability analysis should (and does) neglect these aspects. between redundant and non-redundant ‚-based type spaces, arguing that redundant types should be used only to represent hidden uncertainty entertained by players that the modeler does not explicitly take into account. Coherently with this approach, he suggests the modeler should always use a non-redundant type space unless he is aware there may be some additional strategically relevant information he is unaware of. 36 In our framework, the additional uncertainty is represented by the set of payoff irrelevant states Y and the exogenous beliefs of players are modeled using .‚ Y /-based type spaces. In addition, Liu (2009) also shows that the same Bayesian equilibrium predictions can be obtained both with a ‚-based redundant type space and with an appropriate .‚ Y /-based non-redundant type space. Instead of addressing Bayesian Equilibrium predictions, we use this richer uncertainty space, to highlight the connections among different definitions of rationalizability and to investigate the role of expressible independence restrictions.
A Appendices
To ease notation in the proofs below, given a joint assumption E D E 1 E 2 , for each k 0 we define mutual k-order belief in E as MB k .E/ D \ 0ÄnÄk B n .E/ and, for each player i, we denote the projection of MB k .E/ on X i A i H i by MB 
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix an X-space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I . For each i 2 I and u X;i 2 U X;i define u X;i D .x i ; a i ; h i / 2 U i W .x i ; % X;i .h i // D u X;i :
36 He also provides a necessary and sufficient condition on the space ‚ (called "separativity") to identify a ‚-based redundant type space with a .‚ Y /-based non-redundant type space through a mapping that preserves ‚-hierarchies. Given the finiteness assumption, this condition is satisfied in our framework.
A.2 Measurability of the conditional independence assumption
Since ' i is a homeomorphism, in order to prove that the set H i;CI is measurable it suffices to show that the set of all probability distributions on ‚ 0 X i A i H i satisfying (16) is measurable. This, in turn, follows from the lemma below, letting
Note that E i is indeed countably generated, since X i H X; i is compact metric.) From the proof of the lemma it also follows that the set H i;CI does not depend on the particular version of conditional probability that we choose when defining it, as claimed earlier. Proof. The equivalence between (27) and (28) is well known-see e.g. Billingsley (1995, p. 456) . Now let us verify that the set of all 2 .Z/ satisfying (27) is measurable. Let A be the algebra generated by any countable family that generates F 3 . Observe that for every p 2 OE0; 1, E 2 F and E 3 2 F 3 , the two conditions
are equivalent; 37 denote by M.p; E; E 3 / the set of all 2 .Z/ satisfying (29). By the said equivalence, each such set is measurable. Moreover, the set of all 2 .Z/ satisfying (27) can be written as p;q E 1 2F 1 E 2 2F 2 E 3 2A
.Z/n M.p; E 1 ; E 3 /\M.q; E 2 ; E 3 / [M.pq; E 1 \E 2 ; E 3 / 37 By definition of conditional probability, E 3 OEEjF 3 .z/ .dz/ D OEE \E 3 for every E 3 2 F 3 . Thus, (29) implies (30) and, conversely, (30) implies that the set fz 2 Z W OEEjF 3 .z/ < pg is a F 3 -measurable event of -probability zero, i.e. (29).
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2 Part I
Fix an X-space .T i ; # i ; i ; i / i2I . We prove that for all i 2 I , t i 2 T i and k 0,
The claim is trivially true for k D 0. Now let n 1, assume the claim is true for k D n 1, and fix any i 2 I , t i 2 T i , a i 2 A i , y i 2 Y i and h i 2 H i such that % X;i .h i / D Á X;i .t i / and .# i .t i /; y i ; a i ; h i / 2 MB
